The most exciting thing in law study is, speaking for myself of course, reading the court rulings and opinions in high-profile cases. Over the two months' career as a new law student, I have read scores of court decisions and have learned, while having fun, more about statute law and legal way of thinking than from reading textbooks and statutes. With my experience with various kinds of lawsuit training bit by bit my reasoning and analyzing capacity, I am beginning to compare the different tendencies and approaches of individual judges and courts in different countries. With varying degrees, I agree with some and disagree with others, but I always learn something useful and applicable. It was not until today, while reading the 977 F.2d 798 case (ELSCO v three Motorola attorneys, 3d Cir. 1992) and its sequel 1997, that I felt a real disgust over the lawful injustice justifying judiciary misconduct.
To make a long and complicated story short and simple, Motorola caused ELSCO considerable material and moral damages through a wrongful seizure of its inventory and records on the basis of a vindictive witness statement and concealment of facts freeing ELSCO of the alleged guilt, and that after ELSCO President Jack Snyderman had cooperated in good faith with Motorola in its investigation to find proofs of ELSCO’s allegedly illegal trading of Motorola’s scrap electronic parts. ELSCO sought a summary judgment under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (1988) which constitutes a cause of action for seeking remedies for the damages suffered by reason of a wrongful seizure. I thought that this was a textbook example of a case worthy of the application of this all too just provision. Wide of the mark! ELSCO, which unjustly suffered the seizure of its whole inventory and loss of reputation, not to speak of the unspeakable shame and emotional distress (fifteen persons including federal marshals appearing out of the blue and moving van company employees taking away the inventory and business records!), went out completely empty-handed. By virtue of the statutory provision, ELSCO was actually entitled to just compensation for economic damages and attorneys' fees as well as considerable punitive damages for having suffered a wrongful seizure done in bad faith.
Let me summarize in five short rounds this saga of a downright outrageous legal injustice [freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment] :
First round: bad faith plaintiff causes damages to good faith defendant through a wrongful seizure.
ELSCO always reacted in good faith and showed a responsible conduct by firing the employee who it held responsible for the missing 1.5% of its stock as mentioned in the first auditor's report to Motorola. Despite this report and the second (unannounced) inspection verifying ELSCO’s innocence, Motorola sued his long-standing business partner in 1988. The ex parte seizure order engineered by Motorola’s three attorneys was based on a false witness [a malicious perjury and a prima-facie lie] of a disgruntled former employee as well as the concealment of the facts reported by two company inspectors. Motorola paid the ELSCO's former employee $700 for his "time in preparing his affidavit" [in reality, for his readiness to lie under oath].
Second round: the victim of wrongful seizure seeks remedies for the damages suffered.
In June 1988 ELSCO filed a complaint against Motorola and its attorneys relying on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11): “A person who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure under this subsection has a cause of action against the applicant for the order under which such seizure was made, and shall be entitled to recover such relief as may be appropriate, including damages for lost profits, cost of materials, loss of good will, and punitive damages in instances where the seizure was sought in bad faith, and, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, to recover areasonable attorney’s fee. […]” (italics by me). After two years [!] the district court granted summary judgment in favor of ELSCO [They must have left no stones unturned to avoid it, but they are judges after all], dismissing Motorola's trademark infringement claims. Motorola and ELSCO afterward reached a settlement [To Mr Snyderman's satisfaction, I strongly hope, though I doubt it; the good man must have wanted peace rather than justice]. ELSCO’s claims against the three defendant attorneys were preserved [The brave man challenged the legal guild].
Third round (the shortest round): the wrongdoers successfully deny their responsibility
The three attorneys moved for summary judgment arguing that attorneys are not "applicant" under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11). The district court granted their motion [this time, it did not lose much time]. ELSCO moved for reconsideration on the grounds that defendants could be liable as aiders and abettors, which the district court promptly refused.
Fourth round: the 3d Circuit brings forward its own definition of "applicant" and the "aider and abettor"
In order to decide whether the attorneys were "applicant" within the meaning of the Lanham Act § 1116(d)(11), the court rightly sought answer in § 1127 which defines the term "applicant" to be embracing the "legal representatives" of applicants. Despite this statutory definition and a confirming precedent case (Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 711 F.Supp. 931, 934 (N.D.Ill.1989)), the Court reached the conclusion (after 24 paragraphs of Machiavelli arguments) that the attorneys were not the legal representatives of applicants. To justify its holding that “an attorney is not an ‘applicant’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) and that there is no aiding and abetting liability under that statute,” the Court unfolded similar sounding arguments in 15 long paragraphs.
Fifth round: the Superior Court of Pennsylvania finally indemnifies the wrongdoers
The Court, while acknowledging at least that the Appellees were “proper defendants in Appellants’ wrongful use of civil process action,” denied the cause of action brought forward by ELSCO against the attorneys on the grounds that the attorneys were not the principal agents of the original suit, and finally affirmed the appeal court’s decision [One of the reasons: “judicial economy and efficiency”! I wonder whether it would have been better for ELSCO to file a separate complaint instead of appealing].
In his dissenting opinion [at least one legal conscience], the Superior Court Judge Johnson, pointing to the “unique facts that are presented in this case,” called into question the “determination that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants.” He said, “I would vacate the judgment and remand this action for trial.”
In my desperate efforts to find any good reasons for this apparently absurd conclusion which was assiduously and over-professionally reached by the highly honourable judges, I have gone through the toil and torture of analyzing all those 39 paragraphs of the appeal court decision and reading the 20-page arguments of the superior court decision trying to exonerate the attorneys. To safeguard the non-academic character of this blog, I can only repeat my astonishment which grew from paragraph to paragraph and from page to page.
Motorola and its three attorneys (directly) and all the judges who decided against ELSCO (indirectly) have the eventual death of the healthy company and the downfall of the honest and brave businessman on their conscience. Driven by my earnest wish to see the revival of my sympathetic hero, I tried to find him on the Internet. The great part of the scanty Google hits for Jack Snyderman and his company (Electronic Laboratory Supply Company, Inc.) only related to the lawsuit itself. This seemingly low-profile case, despite its keen peculiarity in terms of legal injustice, has not inspired any journalist's or blogger's pen – until today.
To make a long and complicated story short and simple, Motorola caused ELSCO considerable material and moral damages through a wrongful seizure of its inventory and records on the basis of a vindictive witness statement and concealment of facts freeing ELSCO of the alleged guilt, and that after ELSCO President Jack Snyderman had cooperated in good faith with Motorola in its investigation to find proofs of ELSCO’s allegedly illegal trading of Motorola’s scrap electronic parts. ELSCO sought a summary judgment under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (1988) which constitutes a cause of action for seeking remedies for the damages suffered by reason of a wrongful seizure. I thought that this was a textbook example of a case worthy of the application of this all too just provision. Wide of the mark! ELSCO, which unjustly suffered the seizure of its whole inventory and loss of reputation, not to speak of the unspeakable shame and emotional distress (fifteen persons including federal marshals appearing out of the blue and moving van company employees taking away the inventory and business records!), went out completely empty-handed. By virtue of the statutory provision, ELSCO was actually entitled to just compensation for economic damages and attorneys' fees as well as considerable punitive damages for having suffered a wrongful seizure done in bad faith.
Let me summarize in five short rounds this saga of a downright outrageous legal injustice [freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment] :
First round: bad faith plaintiff causes damages to good faith defendant through a wrongful seizure.
ELSCO always reacted in good faith and showed a responsible conduct by firing the employee who it held responsible for the missing 1.5% of its stock as mentioned in the first auditor's report to Motorola. Despite this report and the second (unannounced) inspection verifying ELSCO’s innocence, Motorola sued his long-standing business partner in 1988. The ex parte seizure order engineered by Motorola’s three attorneys was based on a false witness [a malicious perjury and a prima-facie lie] of a disgruntled former employee as well as the concealment of the facts reported by two company inspectors. Motorola paid the ELSCO's former employee $700 for his "time in preparing his affidavit" [in reality, for his readiness to lie under oath].
Second round: the victim of wrongful seizure seeks remedies for the damages suffered.
In June 1988 ELSCO filed a complaint against Motorola and its attorneys relying on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11): “A person who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure under this subsection has a cause of action against the applicant for the order under which such seizure was made, and shall be entitled to recover such relief as may be appropriate, including damages for lost profits, cost of materials, loss of good will, and punitive damages in instances where the seizure was sought in bad faith, and, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, to recover areasonable attorney’s fee. […]” (italics by me). After two years [!] the district court granted summary judgment in favor of ELSCO [They must have left no stones unturned to avoid it, but they are judges after all], dismissing Motorola's trademark infringement claims. Motorola and ELSCO afterward reached a settlement [To Mr Snyderman's satisfaction, I strongly hope, though I doubt it; the good man must have wanted peace rather than justice]. ELSCO’s claims against the three defendant attorneys were preserved [The brave man challenged the legal guild].
Third round (the shortest round): the wrongdoers successfully deny their responsibility
The three attorneys moved for summary judgment arguing that attorneys are not "applicant" under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11). The district court granted their motion [this time, it did not lose much time]. ELSCO moved for reconsideration on the grounds that defendants could be liable as aiders and abettors, which the district court promptly refused.
Fourth round: the 3d Circuit brings forward its own definition of "applicant" and the "aider and abettor"
In order to decide whether the attorneys were "applicant" within the meaning of the Lanham Act § 1116(d)(11), the court rightly sought answer in § 1127 which defines the term "applicant" to be embracing the "legal representatives" of applicants. Despite this statutory definition and a confirming precedent case (Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 711 F.Supp. 931, 934 (N.D.Ill.1989)), the Court reached the conclusion (after 24 paragraphs of Machiavelli arguments) that the attorneys were not the legal representatives of applicants. To justify its holding that “an attorney is not an ‘applicant’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) and that there is no aiding and abetting liability under that statute,” the Court unfolded similar sounding arguments in 15 long paragraphs.
Fifth round: the Superior Court of Pennsylvania finally indemnifies the wrongdoers
The Court, while acknowledging at least that the Appellees were “proper defendants in Appellants’ wrongful use of civil process action,” denied the cause of action brought forward by ELSCO against the attorneys on the grounds that the attorneys were not the principal agents of the original suit, and finally affirmed the appeal court’s decision [One of the reasons: “judicial economy and efficiency”! I wonder whether it would have been better for ELSCO to file a separate complaint instead of appealing].
In his dissenting opinion [at least one legal conscience], the Superior Court Judge Johnson, pointing to the “unique facts that are presented in this case,” called into question the “determination that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants.” He said, “I would vacate the judgment and remand this action for trial.”
In my desperate efforts to find any good reasons for this apparently absurd conclusion which was assiduously and over-professionally reached by the highly honourable judges, I have gone through the toil and torture of analyzing all those 39 paragraphs of the appeal court decision and reading the 20-page arguments of the superior court decision trying to exonerate the attorneys. To safeguard the non-academic character of this blog, I can only repeat my astonishment which grew from paragraph to paragraph and from page to page.
Motorola and its three attorneys (directly) and all the judges who decided against ELSCO (indirectly) have the eventual death of the healthy company and the downfall of the honest and brave businessman on their conscience. Driven by my earnest wish to see the revival of my sympathetic hero, I tried to find him on the Internet. The great part of the scanty Google hits for Jack Snyderman and his company (Electronic Laboratory Supply Company, Inc.) only related to the lawsuit itself. This seemingly low-profile case, despite its keen peculiarity in terms of legal injustice, has not inspired any journalist's or blogger's pen – until today.
